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Abstract
This article investigates how antitrust agencies should structure the
disclosing of information about eﬃciency gains from interested parties
(merging ￿rms, and competitors) in merger control. We analyze the
particular case of a horizontal merger with danger of foreclosure, where
welfare can decrease either due to insuﬃcient eﬃciency gains (eﬃciency
defense) or due to excessive eﬃciency gains if the competitor exits (eﬃ-
ciency oﬀense). The ￿r s tr e s u l ti st h a te v i d e n c ef r o mc o m p e t i t o r si sn o t
required unless the ex-ante market shares of the merging ￿rms exceed a
threshold. Second, we support the role of advocacy of the parties. The
burden of proof for eﬃciency defense should rest in the insiders (merg-
ing ￿rms) whereas the burden of proof for eﬃciency oﬀense should rest
in outsiders (competitors). Finally, it is optimal to make insiders report
￿rst and outsiders second and any communication among parties has to
be prohibited.
Keywords: Competition Policy, Merger Control, Eﬃciency Gains,
Asymmetry of Information
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11I N T R O D U C T I O N
Information plays a crucial role in the implementation of antitrust policy. The
quali￿cation of an action as anticompetitive usually depends on information that
is known by a ￿rm or a group of them, but it is not available to the Competition
Authority (CA). The reduction in price of the incumbent in response to entry
can be the natural accommodation to a new more competitive scenario but also
can correspond to an outright predatory strategy. A merger can be motivated
by the synergies of combining assets of two ￿rms or it may correspond to an
attempt to reduce the intensity of competition in the industry. In the ￿rst
example, the price is predatory if it is below some measure of the incumbent
supplying cost1. In the second example, the merger is anticompetitive if the
synergies are not enough to oﬀset the increase in market power. For correctly
deciding, the CA needs to extract the critical information primarily from ￿rms
that have some interest in in￿uencing the verdict of the antitrust agency. This
includes not only the ￿rms undertaking the action but also third parties like
competitors, entrants, suppliers or customers that aﬀected by the potentially
anticompetitive action. The challenge for Competition Authorities then, is try
to elicit from involved parties the relevant information they have. However
the incentives to provide evidence and the congruence between the interests
of aﬀected parties and society has to be carefully analyzed at the moment of
implementing a decision rule based in the evidence disclosed by the ￿rms with
some stake in the case2.
In order to analyze the above described problem we have con￿gured a case
of horizontal merger with danger of foreclosure, where the asymmetry of infor-
mation parameter is the level of eﬃciency gains (EG) that is attained by the
merger. In our scenario, the market is very concentrated (only three ￿rms) and
the technology of supply requires high ￿xed cost to stay active in the market.
The competitive concern is twofold, ￿rst if there is not enough EG the ex-post
price will increase due to the reduction in the number of participants and second
if EG are very big, it will cause the exit of the remaining competitor, leading
also to higher prices ex-post (we select the parameters in order to reproduce
a welfare decreasing exit). This scenario gives way to multiple mimicking be-
havior -in terms of information disclosure- from both the merging ￿rms and
competitors. When EG are low, ￿rms will pretend that they are higher, when
EG induce exit, merging ￿rms will try to convince the regulator that they are
lower. Competitors, whenever EG are high, will push for blocking the merger
even if they do not exit, and they will strategically keep silent when the problem
is about insuﬃcient EG because they free ride in the merger of the two other
￿rms.
We solve this information revelation problem by using Bayesian subgame
1In the U.S. jurisdiction, for instance, courts have relied mostly in the Areeda-Turner rule
to decide about predation cases. Under that standard, a price is considered as predatory if it
is below the average variable cost of producing the good.
2See Rey (2000) for an extension of this argument.
2perfect implementation. In our model, parties can costly manipulate the evi-
dence, creating an intermediate regime between the extreme cases of soft and
hard information and CA disposes of limited instruments to elicit the truth: the
standard of proof and the decision about the merger (approve or reject). The
results obtained allow us to provide robust answer to the following questions:
(1) When evidence from third parties is strictly needed, (2) which party has the
burden of proof for each of the possible anticompetitive eﬀects of the merger, (3)
how to establish the order of disclosing and (4) whether ex-ante communication
among parties is desirable.
First, evidence from competitors strongly improves the results only if the
ex-ante market power of merging ￿rms exceeds some threshold. Higher ex-
ante market shares reduces the range of admissible merger in terms of eﬃciency
gains. This reduction in the range leads to an imperfect two-side screening if the
standard of proofs for eﬃciency defense and oﬀense con￿ict between them3.T o
better understand this situation, suppose ￿rst that CA worries only about insuf-
￿cient EG. The CA can achieve a perfect screening by setting a high standard
of proof to ￿rms and thus overcome the problem of manipulation of evidence (as
is done in US jurisdiction). However, if the anticompetitive danger is in both
directions (excessive and insuﬃcient EG), forcing ￿rms to prove that eﬃciency
gains are big enough, by applying a very strict standard of proof, may have
the adverse eﬀect of attracting mergers that lead to undesirable exit and vice-
versa. The exacerbation of the asymmetry of information problem by high level
of market shares can explain why antitrust agencies are reluctant to consider
evidence in cases of mergers where the level of concentration in the market is
large and rather adopt a per se decision. This also explains why merging ￿rms
may be reluctant to rely on the eﬃciency defense principle, if this may generate
suspects about the opposite problem: eﬃciency oﬀense.
The results are ameliorated if CA employs a report from outsiders to check
the evidence submitted by insiders. The perfect screening is achieved if the
burden of proof is allocated in a way where insiders have only to satisfy the
eﬃciency defense threshold and outsiders have to prove that the merger leads
to its exit. With two informed agents, CA can move upwards the standard of
proof for eﬃciency defense without risking to attract very eﬃcient types, since
those will be blocked by an outsiders counter-report. The risk that outsiders
overstate the EG can be controlled by demanding a high standard of proof for a
claim of foreclosure. This rule coupled with sequential disclosure leads that in
equilibrium only good mergers are presented. The specialization in the burden
of proof result hinges in the coincidence of interest between parties and CA for
each of the two potential anticompetitive dangers of the merger. Notice that
outsiders do not have incentives to provide evidence about a eﬃciency defense
3The ￿Eﬃciency Defense￿ principle is known as the positive consideration by antitrust
authorities of synergies and cost savings of a merger that attenuate the otherwise negative
eﬀect of increased concentration in the market. By the contrary, the ￿Eﬃciency Oﬀense￿
principle is the negative consideration of eﬃciency gains when they lead to the exit of the
competitor and this exit reduces welfare.
3case, since any truthful report they make would lead to a decision that goes
against them. Thus, a policy that switch the allocation of the burden of proof
would not be optimal since the evidence provided by one agent -the outsiders-
would not be informative.
We further allow for diﬀerent degree of reliability of outsiders by assuming
that there is a strictly positive probability that they are not informed. We ￿nd
that the uncertainty about whether outsiders are capable to present a credible
counter-report acts as a deterrence against excessive manipulation of evidence
from insiders. This result has several interesting and not always intuitive im-
plications for the design of the disclosure policy. About the timing of disclosing
evidence, is optimal to make insiders report before outsiders do. The general
rule is that CA has to avoid to make public what outsiders know and by conse-
quence, the standard of proof applied to insiders has to be independent of that
contingency. This result makes a case against transparency, an attribute usually
deemed as desirable in antitrust disclosure proceedings. Finally, communication
among both parties can occur if outsiders are informed and the merger leads
to its exit. Although is ex-post eﬃcient to allow that communication, because
avoid parties to spend resources in disclosing without modifying the CA deci-
sion, ex-ante is ineﬃcient because it eliminates the deterrence eﬀect, which is
useful in the state of the world where merger produces exit but outsiders have
no counter-evidence.
The situation that we attempt to represent is well illustrated by two cases of
mergers presented before the European Commission. In General Electric (GE) -
Honeywell, a merger of complementary goods, the Commission blocked the deal
based in the fact that competitors (supplying only single components) would not
be able to properly match a bundle of engines and avionics oﬀered by the new
￿rm4. The Commission considered that this commercial disadvantage would
severely put at risk the viability of rivals. Merging parties contested that claim,
trying to explain that bundling would not be the preferred strategy of the new
￿rm5. In Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Haviland6 (a merger between manufacturers
of small and medium size aircraft) the synergies arising from combining the pro-
duction of aircraft of diﬀerent sizes plus the advantages of standardization and
commercialization vis a vis competitors by oﬀering the full range of products to
airlines also raised fears in the Commission about the exit of the two other com-
petitors. These two examples belong to industries that given their technological
4General Electric/Honeywell, Case COMP/M.2220 (2001). Although this merger has no
relevant horizontal overlaps, and is rather a merger of complementary goods, the discussion
about whether EG should play in favour or against the case is representative of the situation
we wish to characterize.
5This argument is extended in Patterson and Shapiro (2001). Interestingly, they mention
the fact that the main buyers of aircraft components -Airbus and Boeing- did not oppose
the merger. The decision of the European Commission on the GE-Honeywell merger have
generated a big discussion among antitrust scholar and practitioners about the desirability
of applying the Eﬃciency Oﬀense doctrine. Padilla (2002) proposes a set of conditions to be
satis￿ed in order to apply the doctrine. Evans and Salinger (2002), using a decision theoretical
approach, expose the risks of abuse and confusion on antitrust if the doctrine is employed.
6Aerospatiale/Alenia/De Haviland. Case No IV/M.53 (1991)
4nature have strong economies of scale, sunk costs are relevant and entry is not
commonly observed. Consequently, the concentration in these markets is high,
which gives ground to the concern of antitrust authorities for the prospect of
exit of one of the participants. From the point of view of the evidence disclosure
strategy of involved parties, rivals played an active role in trying to prove that
the merger would lead to a scenario of a dominant ￿rm with negative conse-
quences for themselves and consumers in the long run7.I n s i d e r s m a d e e ﬀorts
to understate the technical and commercial eﬃciencies from the merger and
paradoxically, some otherwise welcomed eﬀects from the deal such as buyers
discounts, cost savings in maintenance and standardization were turned against
the insiders cause.
Relationship with the Literature. The horizontal foreclosure eﬀect that
stems from the merger for high values of EG builds in similar foundations of
many well known contributions in the literature of Industrial Organization such
as the entry preemption model by Dixit (1980), tying by Whinston8 (1990)
and bundling by Nalebuﬀ (1999). All these models have in common that one
￿rm ex-ante takes a strategic action in order to compete more aggressively ex-
post. If the rival stays in the market the result is welcomed since price will
diminish, but if ￿xed cost are signi￿cative, the strategy may induce the exit of
the competitor and the outcome may be negative in terms of higher prices. In
general, the above models are a representation of the ￿top dog￿ strategy described
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) where ￿rms over-invest in cost reduction in
order to credibly drive out competitors from the market, and that strategy
applies whether ￿rms compete with prices or quantities. Here, since the EG
are exogenous and merging is always pro￿table, foreclosure is not the primary
purpose of insiders, although it increases the bene￿ts from merging whenever it
happens.
The article is also related to the extensive literature on information disclo-
sure and transmission under asymmetry of information. As in the cheap talk
models, like the seminal paper of Crawford and Sobel (1984) and its extensions
in the lobbying literature9, the allocation of the burden of proof is consistent
with the convergence of interests between informed parties and the society, al-
though what is distinctive in our setting, and that draws form the underlying
oligopoly model, is that potentially informed ￿rms have common and opposite
interest between them and with respect to the CA depending on the value of
the unknown parameter. The paper is also associated to Milgrom and Roberts
(1986), who proposes a ￿skeptical rule￿ to extract information from interested
parties. They constraint the disclosure strategies of the parties to either tell
the truth or omit the evidence, even though a modi￿ed rule that includes the
7This active role was played by British Aerospace and Fokker in the Aerospatiale-Alenia
merger and by Rolls Royce and United Technologies in the GE-honeywell case.
8Whinston (1990) has been the most in￿uential paper of the post-chicago era to theoreti-
cally support the per se illegality of tying in the U.S..
9Grossman and Helpman (2001) present a comprehensive review of how lobbyists can
credible transmit information to the authority about the eﬀe c to fp o l i c i e st h a ta ﬀect them.
5concealing eﬀect could be applied to a merger without foreclosure problems,
the possibility of manipulation hurts when the screening is two-sided as in our
model.
We share the advocacy result of Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) although for
diﬀerent reasons. In their model, agents are rewarded by ￿nding hard evidence
that allows the principal to move from the status-quo. Therefore a system of
specialization of agents (advocates) in each side, produces more information (or
induces more eﬀort) than a having a single non-partisan agent searching evidence
that supports con￿icting causes. In our model, information is exogenously given
to the parties and the eﬀort is rather allocated to the manipulation task. Our
advocacy result stems form the combined eﬀects of the incentives to disclose
the information when is convenient to do it with the impossibility of having
two-sides screening when the evidence can be concealed10.
We proceed as follows: First, we set the oligopoly model and explicit the
information transmission technology. Secondly, we derive the optimal disclosure
policy for diﬀerent levels of reliability of the outsiders and ￿nally we consider two
extensions: one where we endogenize the sequence of disclosure and the other
when we allow for interim communication among parties. In the last section we
conclude.
2T H E M O D E L
We have a highly concentrated market formed by three ￿rms, where two of
them, that we label ￿the insiders￿, want to merge. Without loss of generality,
we assume that ex-ante and ex-post the merger, ￿rms face a market downward
slope demand, oﬀer an homogenous product and compete using quantities as
strategic variables11. The cost function of the ￿rms, before merging, is given
by Ci = F + ciqi ,w h e r eF is a ￿xed and avoidable cost, that has to be
incurred in all the periods and before the ￿rm decides how much to produce.
The parameters ci and qi are the marginal cost and quantity supplied per each
￿rm. For simplicity it is assumed that F is similar to all ￿rms and is independent
of the market share. Insiders are symmetric, having both an ex-ante marginal
cost equal to c1. If the merger takes place, the new ￿rm will have a variable
cost equal to c1 − θ. The cost structure of the outsider remains unaltered after





speci￿c to the merger and is known by the insiders but also can be learned by
the outsiders.
The payoﬀs of the parties aﬀected by the deal - insiders, outsiders and
consumers- is denoted as ΠI (θ), Π0 (θ) and S (θ) respectively and they rep-
resent the change in the surplus, measured in monetary units, of each party
if the merger is approved. Payoﬀs satisfy the following properties: Π0
I () ≥ 0,
Π0
0 () ≤ 0 and S0 () ≥ 0, as long as no exit occurs after the merger. These
10For instance, if manipulation were not possible, then it would be suﬃcient to count only
with the insiders to obtain the perfect screening.
11Results are robust to other models of competition.
6properties are common to the standard models of imperfect competition where
lower marginal cost makes a ￿rm more pro￿table, harms rival pro￿ts and pushes
down the equilibrium prices. It is further assumed that only pro￿table mergers
are proposed, i.e. ΠI () ≥ 0 for all θ, and when the merger does not bring any
eﬃciency gains, the suppressed rivalry in the market makes competitors better
oﬀ and consumers worst oﬀ, i.e. Π0 (0) ≥ 0 and S (0) ≤ 0.
We de￿ne the threshold θ1 such that: S (θ1)=0and it is assumed that
Π0 (θ1)=0 , which implies that S () ≤ 0 and Π0 () ≥ 0 for θ ≤ θ1 and also
S () ≥ 0 and Π0 () ≥ 0 for θ ≤ θ1 The cut-oﬀ value θ1 corresponds to the
￿eﬃciency defense￿ threshold and is interpreted as the minimum level of eﬃ-
ciency gains that leaves consumers at least as good as in the scenario without
merger. The fact that any merger with θ in the neighborhood of θ1 that favors
consumers hurts competitors and vice versa is satis￿ed by most of the models
of oligopoly competition such as classic Cournot and price competition with im-
perfect substitutes. More explanation about this property is provided by Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) and Duso, Neven and Roller (2003)12
There is a possibility of exit when the merging ￿rms become very eﬃcient
and the post-merger pro￿ts of the outsider are not enough to cover the ￿xed
cost of being in the market. If the outsider ex-ante cannot break even, its
best strategy is to leave the market without incurring in the ￿xed cost13 F.
We de￿ne θ2 as the eﬃciency oﬀense t h r e s h o l ds u c ht h a t :ΠD
O (θ2) − F =0 ,
where ΠD
0 (θ2) is the post-merger duopoly pro￿ts of the outsiders. Since ΠD
0 (θ2)
is decreasing, the competitor leaves the market for any θ ≥ θ2.T oc o n ￿gure a
situation of non-desirable exit we look for cases where S () ≤ 0 for all θ ≥ θ2.
This case is possible to occur if the magnitude of the ￿xed and avoidable cost is
over some minimum value14 Fmin. From the de￿nition of the eﬃciency oﬀense
threshold, we know that θ2 is decreasing in F,t h u s ,l a r g e rF makes that exit
happens at lower values of θ which involves higher prices and lower values of
consumer surplus in the post merger scenario. In other words, when F ≥ Fmin
t h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of suppressing a competitor dominates over the positive
eﬀect of cost reduction. Finally it is assumed that S
¡ﬂ θ
¢
≤ 0, which implies
that the change in consumer surplus can not be positive if the merger leads
to a monopoly. Figure 1 shows the payoﬀs of the parties involved in function
of the parameter θ, we can observe that the exit of the outsider produces a
discontinuity in the payoﬀs of insiders and consume
12Based in this property, Duso et al (2003) use the reaction of the stock value of competitors
to asses whether a merger is anti or pro-competitive. They provide a proof why the property is
held when the competition is waged through prices. This results hinges in the fact that prices
are strategic complements, so whenever the post-merger scenario pushes up insider prices,
outsiders will react by also increasing prices making the former better oﬀ and consumers
worst oﬀ. The opposite result holds when insiders reduce price after the merger. This clear
causality is lost when the competition is through quantities.
13More technically, when θ ≥ θ2, competitor￿ exit is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
two stage game where in the ￿rst stage ￿rms wanting to be in the market have to pay F and
in the second stage, the participating ￿rms compete oﬀering quantities qi (θ).
14For lower values of F a n yp r o s p e c to fe x i tw o u l db eag o o di n d i c a t o ro fl o wf u t u r ep r i c e s
in the market.
7Competition Authority decides about the merger using consumer surplus as
standard. With the notation already introduced, the merger is allowed when-
ever S(θ) ≥ 0 or equivalently if θ ∈ [θ1,θ2], otherwise the merger is blocked.
Generally speaking, the CA is concerned about how competition will work in
the after-merger scenario. In our setting, there are two unknown factors that
will determine the new market equilibrium: the level of eﬃciency gains θ, and
the existence of a remaining competitor. Since the occurrence of exit depends on
θ, we have that the level of eﬃciency gains jointly with the other known param-
eters of the demand and cost function are the suﬃcient statistics to predict the
future equilibrium of the market15. Summarizing, CA accepts a reduction the
number of competitors as long as there is enough cost savings that are passed
to consumers (Eﬃciency Defense argument), and at the same time, the cost
saving are not be big enough to induce the exit of the remaining competitor
(Eﬃciency Oﬀense￿a r g u m e n t) .
Merger Enforcement and Information disclosure. The parameters
of the demand and cost function of ￿rms are public information, there is only
asymmetric information respect to θ. The CA can ask the insiders and outsiders
to provide evidence about the magnitude of eﬃciency gains. Informed parties
can produce a piece of information that is accepted as evidence by the CA. This
evidence can be concealed at some cost, which is proportional to the level of
manipulation. As we know, ￿rms spend resources in convincing the authori-
ties at the merger revision stages, they hire specialized teams of lawyers and
economists to present the case in a convincing way to the antitrust agency. We
set up an evidence production cost function whose nature is coherent with the
fact that when ￿rms have a more diﬃcult case to defend, they have to spend
more resources to produce a convincing piece of information. Hence, we have
that C = C(￿ θ − θ) where ￿ θ is the pretended level of EG and θ is the true
value. We assume that C is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function such that
C00 () ≥ 0,C(0) = C0 (0) = 0 and C(￿ θ−θ)=C(θ−￿ θ). These assumptions yield
to a convex ￿lying￿ cost function that is symmetric respect to the real type.
Notice that this model of manipulable creation of evidence, is a generalization
of the extreme cases of hard and soft information. We can re-write the manipu-
lation cost function as C = C(α,e) where e = θ −￿ θ is the lying eﬀort term and
α i sap a r a m e t e rr e l a t e dw i t ht h ec u r v a t u r eo ft h ef u n c t i o ns u c ht h a tCα ≥ 0
and Cαe ≥ 0, where the subscripts stand for partial derivatives. When α =0we
are in the case of pure soft information and any message sent to CA has to be
considered as cheap talk communication. Conversely, when α tends to in￿nity,
the shown evidence is hard information16. The intermediate regime of conceal-
ing evidence, we think is more representative of what is observed in antitrust
proceeding where diﬀerent parties use to present acceptable evidence that sup-
15We focus here only in problems derived from single dominance or lessen of competition.
We do not consider ￿joint dominance￿ issues like increased danger of collusion that may arise
from the merger.
16This is the case ilustrated in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) where the informed agent have
either the possibility tell the truth or not to disclose information at all.
8port con￿icting views. We only impose the constraint that α ∈ (α0,+∞), thus,
lying is costly enough to make feasible some upward and downward screening
for most of the types θ.
The speci￿cation of lying cost is similar to the one employed by Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (1995). In their model the optimal policy applied by the regu-
lator induces to the informed party to lie. Similar result, although in a diﬀerent
setting is found in Sanchirico (2001)17. This property is found in models of par-
tial veri￿ability,as demonstrated by Laﬀont and Green (1986), when the space
of feasible messages is restricted, it is not always possible to implement a mech-
anism or decision rule truthfully.
We assume that informed parties are not forced to provide information if they
do not wish. They can either send a document providing not useful information
or refuse to submit any message at all. Any of these non-collaborative actions
that we name as ￿uninformative message ￿ are equally informative and have
zero cost for the party. On the other hand, not informed parties are not able
to produce evidence to be accepted by CA and therefore they just send the
uninformative message if they are called for.
Form the literature we know that the principal (CA in this case ) can ob-
tain information from the fact that agents decide to omit the presentation of
evidence that is very likely they have. In our model, since insiders are perfectly
informed, any refusal to provide information will naturally play against them.
In this case, we can apply the sophisticated skepticism approach of Milgrom
and Roberts (1986), and penalize them - with no merger - if they do not present
evidence. However, the no-cooperation strategy from outsiders has no unique
interpretation and moreover the skeptical rule has no trivial application since
in general we do not know a priori what is the worst scenario for outsiders.
Optimal disclosure policy only with insiders. T h ed i s c l o s u r eg a m ec o n -
sists in a evidence about eﬃciency gains ￿I (θ):Θ −→ ￿ Θ, submitted by the
merging ￿rms to the CA, a standard of proof or admissible interval RI ⊂ ￿ Θ
and a decision variable: X (￿I,R I):￿ Θx￿ Θ → ￿ X ≡ [0,1],that corresponds to
the probability of accepting the merger given the evidence and the standard
o fp r o o f .T h es e to ff e a s i b l em e s s a g e si st h es a m ea st h es e to ft y p e sp l u st h e
omission action i.e; ￿ Θ ≡ Θ ∪ {0}, where 0 is the uninformative message.
The timing of the disclosure game is the following:
T=1 Insiders announce to CA they want to merge (we assume this an-
nouncement is costless)
T=2 CA de￿nes the standard of proof RI , the decision policy X (￿I,R I)
and asks insiders to provide evidence ￿I.
17Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) show that, in a standard procurement contract with
asymmetry of information, it is optimal to induce falsi￿cation of cost reports. The falsi￿cation
acts a countervailing incentives device that makes more costly for the eﬃcient type to mimic
the less eﬃcient agents and therefore reduces the rents to be transfer to the former. Sanchirico
(2001) with a more general speci￿cation of evidence cost function shows that is not optimal to
induce minimal cost evidence production, this in our model is translated to not-truthtelling
implementation.
9T=3 Insiders decide whether or not to create a report ￿I, knowing their
type θ, the standard of proof required RI and the decision rule X (￿I,R I) of
the CA.
T=4 The merger is approved if and only if insiders present a message
accordingly with the above de￿ned rule, otherwise the merger is not accepted.
It is clear that if we are in the hard information regime (α →∞ ),t h ea d -
missible interval is: RI ≡ [θ1,θ2] and the optimal rule is : X () = 1 if ￿I ∈ RI
and X () = 0 otherwise. However, in the general case, when lying is feasible,
applying the above policy would lead to the approval of undesirables mergers.
Some ￿rms with insuﬃcient E.G. will pretend to be θ1and others with excessive
θ will ￿nd feasible to mimic the θ2. (see ￿gure 2). Intuitively, the solution for
this problem is to reduce the interval RI by moving inwards the limits of it, in
a way that only the goods types present admissible evidence. More formally,
de￿ning the net utility of insiders as U (θ),w eh a v e :
U (θ)=X (￿I)ΠI (θ) − C (￿I − θ) (1)





otherwise X () = 0. The limits of RI: ￿ θ1 and ￿ θ2 are derived from the two
incentive compatible (IC) constraints represented by equations 2 and 3. The ￿rst
constraint is for the eﬃciency defense case, thus, we set ￿ θ1 in a way that makes
U (θ1)=0 . Since U0 (θ) ≥ 0, any low θ type will be discourage of mimicking
t h em o r ee ﬃcient types. The equation 3 is the eﬃciency oﬀense constraint that
applies for the types in the neighborhood of θ2,a sa b o v e ,w es e t￿ θ2 such that
U (θ2)=0 18.
U (θ)=ΠI (θ) − C
³
￿ θ1 − θ
´
≤ 0 ∀θ ≤ θ1 (2)
U (θ)=ΠI (θ) − C
³
θ − ￿ θ2
´
≤ 0 ∀θ ≥ θ2 (3)
It is clear that the implementation of the optimal policy is not thruthfull,








will present a message ￿I (θ) 6= θ. It is precisely by inducing to lie that we
prevent that the bad types mimic the good types. The policy achieves the ￿rst
best as long as ￿ θ2 ≥ ￿ θ1, if this condition is violated, the CA cannot have the
perfect screening. To understand better this phenomenon we have to explore
on what depends the choice of the threshold standards ￿ θ1,and ￿ θ2. We denote
∆θ(λ)=θ2 (λ) − θ1 (λ) as the length of the perfect information admissible
range, where λ is a parameter that is negatively related with c1 (the ex-ante
18In this case is not trivial that U0 () ≤ 0. However, the condition that the technology
of evidence production is reliable enough (α suﬃciently big) to guarantee the existence of
a message ￿ θ2 ∈ Θ is the suﬃcient condition for having: C0 () ≥ Π0
I () and by consequence:
U0 () ≤ 0 for all θ ≥ ￿ θ2.
10marginal cost of the ￿rms to merge ) and represents the added market share
of the insiders before merging. The way λ aﬀects ∆θ(λ) is twofold. First, for
high values of λ, merging ￿rms must pass a more demanding eﬃciency defense
test because the merger is suppressing a bigger and more eﬃcient competitor.
If we want to keep prices at least at the same level as before the merger, the
cost reduction has to be larger in order to oﬀset the negative eﬀect of reducing
competition in the market, and this negative eﬀect becomes more signi￿cative
the bigger λ is19. Secondly, higher λ means lower market share and lower ex-
ante pro￿ts of the competitor. In consequence, since Π0
0 (θ) ≤ 0,high values of λ
make the outsider more vulnerable to exit because it induces to quit the market
with lower values of θ.T h e s e t w o e ﬀects imply that ∆θ(λ) unambiguously
decreases with λ because θ
0
1 (λ) ≥ 0 and θ
0
2 (λ) ≤ 0. From equations 2 and 3 we
obtain that the asymmetric information thresholds ￿ θi are increasing in θi,t h u s ,




As λ increases, the range of feasible merger reduces and the standard of
proof range reduces as well. Since ∆θ(λ) ≥ ∆￿ θ(λ), for very high values of λ it
is possible to have a case where ∆θ(λ) > 0 and ∆￿ θ(λ) ≤ 0. In the anomalous
s i t u a t i o no fh a v i n g￿ θ1 ≥ ￿ θ2 both thresholds con￿ict between each other. In
order to solve the eﬃciency oﬀense problem, CA moves ￿ θ1 upwards, but if its
optimal location is above to ￿ θ2, the former thresholds will attract the high θ
types, rendering innocuous ￿ θ2 for the purpose of screening out the oﬀensive
types. For the very same reason, we have that ￿ θ2 now will attract the low θ
types. Obviously this reversion of roles of the thresholds is not eﬃcient in terms
of optimal screening, and in this particular case of high λ mergers, the policy
de￿ned by the equations 2 and 3 has to be modi￿ed. Whenever full separation
is not feasible (∆￿ θ(λ) ≤ 0), the admissible standard of proof reduces to the
minimum and any merger has to satisfy the unique standard θI in order to be
accepted20.
a negative range of admissible messages has the following interpretation:
if CA worries about the eﬃciency defense problem, it will move ￿ θ1 upwards
in order to overcome the manipulation problem. When ∆θ(λ) is small, the
optimal location of ￿ θ1 may con￿ict with the optimal location of ￿ θ2, and may
end up attracting the eﬃciency oﬀensive types if ￿ θ1 ≥ ￿ θ2, rendering useless ￿ θ2
for the purpose of screening out the oﬀensive types and by the same token,
￿ θ1becomes useless for leaving out the low θ types. Obviously this reversion of
19In the case of cournot competition with homogeneous goods, merging implies supressing
one ￿r m ,h e n c e ,t h el o s sf o rc o n s u m e ri sl a r g e rw h e nc1 is smaller (or λ bigger). Under price
competition between imperefect substitutes, the merged ￿rm prices less agressively because
it internalizes the loss in pro￿t in the other brand. This external eﬀect is more prominent
when c1 is lower because the mark-up is bigger and by consequence the pro￿tl o s ti sm o r e
signi￿cant.
20When full separation is feasible, each IC constraint is ￿specialized￿ in overcoming one
problem, either eﬃciency defense (equation 2) or eﬃciency oﬀense (equation 3). In the case
of high λ,both constraints have to face both problems which is equivalent to have only one
constraint with one standard.
11roles of the thresholds is not eﬃcient in terms of optimal screening, and in this
particular case of high λ mergers the policy de￿ned by the equations 2 and 3
has to be modi￿ed21. Whenever, full separation is not feasible (∆￿ θ(λ) ≤ 0),t h e
admissible standard of proof reduces to the minimum and any merger has to
satisfy the unique standard θI in order to be accepted.
Proposition 1 There exists a λ = λ
c such that ∆￿ θ(λ
c)=0 . If λ ≤ λ
c, the ￿rst




with ￿ θ2 ≥ ￿ θ1, as the
required standard of proof to separate the types. If λ ≥ λ
c the standard of proof
is a singleton: RI ≡ {θI}, CA cannot fully screen out the non-desired types and
some level of error is present.
When λ ≥ λ







s.t. the incentive compatible constraints:



















































2 are the limits of the range where the merger is going
to be admissible. By the de￿nition of λ
c we know that θ
∗
1 ≤ θ1 and θ
∗
2 ≥ θ2,
which re￿ects that the optimal policy includes some level error because some
undesirables mergers will be accepted. We denote error as type I if there is
insuﬃcient cost saving or θ ∈ [θ
∗
1,θ1] and type III if the merger leads to exit
or θ ∈ [θ2,θ
∗
2]. In the case of an interior solution, the value of the derivative
in equation 5 is equal to zero and the optimal standard θI is set in a way that
makes in the margin both types of error equal. A corner solution is possible to
exist when λ is slightly over λ
cand, given the discontinuity in the S () function
for θ = θ2, the CA prefers to take only type I error avoiding the bigger loss
derived form type III error. In this case θI is ￿xed at the minimum level, which
is equal to the threshold ￿ θ2 of the previous policy. Finally, it is assumed that the
21When full separation is feasible, each IC constraint is ￿specialized￿ in getting rid of one
problem, either eﬃciency defense (equation 2) or eﬃciency oﬀense (equation 3). In the pres-
ence of the
12new optimal policy increases the expected consumer surplus, i.e. E [S∗ ()] ≥ 0.
This is equivalent to say that is less costly to take the type I and III error than
taking type II error or having the risk of rejecting good mergers.
We have shown that when merging ￿rms enjoy a substantial market power,
they have to satisfy a stricter standard of proof for eﬃciency defense and also
for eﬃciency oﬀense. When there exist the possibility of concealing evidence in
both directions, satisfying a very strict standard of proof for eﬃciency defense
will naturally raise suspicion about the opposite problem: eﬃciency oﬀense.
This danger of back-￿ring in the disclosing strategy is what we call the ￿double
trap￿ of the eﬃciency gains argument and a merger that initially was challenged
in basis of low E.G. can be blocked by the danger of high E.G. and vice versa.
To face this dilemma, if CA still wants to apply some screening to capture
some good mergers, it has to reduce the standard of proof to an unique value22.
Notice that CA cannot distinguish if the ￿rms that satisfy the unique standard
θI are overplaying or underplaying the magnitude of cost savings.
Introducing Outsiders Competitors are an important source of information.
As mentioned by Scheﬀman (2002), their contribution is useful to understand
many aspects of how competition works in the market e.g. what are the pricing
strategies or what is the level of substitution among diﬀerent suppliers. By their
knowledge of the industry, they are also able to asses the magnitude of cost
advantages that a merger can achieve in terms of economies of scale, enhancing
services to costumers and better bargaining power vis a vis suppliers. What
remains no so clear is how to provide incentives to competitors to disclose the
information they have.
We assume, that with a probability ρ ≤ 1 they learn the value of θ. The
parameter ρ is exogenous and known by the CA and insiders as well. Only
outsiders know if they have ￿nally learned θ. CA and insiders know that with
some probability they may learn about the eﬃciency gains carried by the merger,
but both do not know exactly if competitors ￿nally knew the truth. As explained
above, if nature determines that outsiders do not learn the parameter θ, they
cannot report any acceptable evidence if they are asked to do it. However, if
outsiders learn θ, they can either present a report ￿0 (θ) based on what they have
learned or they can pretend not to know θ and just provide an uninformative
message. As we will see later, this second source of asymmetry of information
-whether outsiders are informed- that gives way to a strategic report decision
from the outsiders, plays a relevant role in the design of the optimal disclosure
policy
22As we mentioned above, this is valid under the condition that type II error is larger
than type I plus type III error. If manipulation is not very costly, that condition is reversed
and CA must reject any merger no matter the evidence disclosed by the insiders. Lagerlof
and Heidhues (2002) found also that under some circunstances is better not to accept an
eﬃciency defense argument. This is desirable when the in￿uence cost of producing evidence
oﬀset the bene￿t of having better information. That policy requires the commitment ex-post
of not accepting any defense. In our model there is no problem of commitment, because the
evidence to be presented may induce to costly error.
13Following from proposition 1,w ea n a l y z et h ec a s eo fλ ≥ λ
C, where counting
only with insiders report is not enough to get the ￿rst best. We add now to the
disclosure game de￿ned above, an outsiders message: ￿0 (θ):Θ −→ ￿ Θ and an
admissible interval for outsiders evidence: R0 ⊂ ￿ Θ. The instrument of decision
about the merger becomes: X (￿I,￿ 0,R I,R 0):￿ Θ4 → ￿ X ≡ [0,1]. The disclosure
process is set in a sequential way by introducing an outsiders report that follows
the report of the insiders. Later, we look at the eﬀects of switching the order of
disclosure between parties.
T=1 Insiders announce to CA they want to merge (this announcement
is costless)
T=2 With probability ρ, outsiders learn the value of θ.
T=3 CA de￿nes the admissible standards of proof RI and R0 ,t h ed e -
cision policy X () and asks ￿rst insiders to provide evidence ￿I.
T=5 Insiders decide whether or not to present a report ￿I about eﬃ-
ciency gains, knowing their type θ, the standards of proof required {RI,R 0}
and the decision rule of the CA.
T=6 If the message presented by insiders is such that ￿I ∈ RI,C Aa s k s
then for a message ￿0 from outsiders. Otherwise the merger is rejected.
T=7 Outsiders, based on what they have learned on θ, in the standard
R0 and in the decision rule decide whether or not to present a report ￿0 to the
CA.
T=8 CA blocks the merger if and only if the report presented by out-
siders accomplish the rule: ￿0 ∈ RO. Otherwise, the merger is accepted.
In the timing just presented we have already included some features of the
decision policy for reasons that will become clear below.
We proceed by backward induction, solving for the optimal R0, ￿rst in the
scenario where outsiders have learned θ and insiders at T=4 have satis￿ed the
standard required, i.e. ￿I ∈ RI. In what follows we analyze how CA can employ
outsiders in order to get rid of the remaining type I and type III errors.
Type III error. Proceeding in the same way as we did for de￿ning the
insiders￿ standard, CA selects a standard of proof θ0 in order to have eﬃcient
separation of types above and below θ2.
Outsiders select a evidence or message ￿0 that maximizes:
U (θ)=X (￿O)ΠI (θ) − C (￿O − θ)
Since we want to avoid the exit of the competitor, the optimal rule is given
by :X () = 1 if ￿O ≤ θ0 and X () = 0 if ￿O ≥ θ0. The threshold θ0 is de￿ned by
U (θ2)=ΠO (θ2)=−C (θ0 − θ2) (6)
Equation 6 says that the threshold θ0 is selected in such way that the θ2
type is indiﬀerent between presenting a report that leads to block the merger or
to not opposing the merger and leaving the market afterwards. Since the utility
of outsiders is decreasing in θ we have that all types that are bigger than θ2 will
present evidence, in the other side, for types lower than θ2, is better to face a
14tougher competitor than creating an admissible evidence that would induce the
rejection of the merger. The main message is that CA can delegate to outsiders
the task of detecting eﬃciency ￿oﬀensive￿ mergers and whenever θ is greater than
θ2 the outsider will have incentive to present the evidence23. This result is based
in the fact that when θ ≥ θ2 and exit may occurs, both consumer surplus and
outsiders payoﬀ are negative and there is full coincidence of interest between
both parties. However, provided that any type in the neighborhood of θ2 will
have an incentive to claim that the merger leads to exit, the CA has to select
the standard of evidence θ0 big enough in order to discourage the mimicking of
the types θ ≤ θ2 and in this way avoiding to block a merger that is good for
consumers (this is why a cheap talk communication is not useful in this case).
Type I error In the case that θ lays around θ1, outsiders are not going to
disclose the evidence they have because it goes against its interest. To see this,
suppose ￿rst that manipulation is extremely costly, so ￿rms cannot lie about the
magnitude of EG. When θ ≤ θ1 we have that ΠO () ≥ 0 and S () ≤ 0 in case the
merger is approved. Whenever outsiders present evidence, the merger is blocked
and outsiders are worst-oﬀ than any scenario that considers the approval of the
merger with some positive probability. Hence, outsiders have no incentives to
present a report and they will pretend that they do not know the truth. When
θ ≥ θ1 we have an analogous result, since ΠO () ≤ 0 and S () ≥ 0, whenever
outsiders present a report, CA will approve the deal, decision that will hurt the
competitors. For any decision rule that the CA can implement, non presenting
evidence is the dominant pure strategy for outsiders24. When the uncertainty is
about whether θ lays above or below θ1, there is no transmission of information
at all from the fact that outsiders do not show evidence and CA gets no update
of beliefs about the distribution of θ from that omission. Contrary to the case
of type III error, in this situation, CA cannot delegate in outsiders the task
of detecting mergers with insuﬃcient eﬃciency gains. The total divergence of
interest between the CA and the competitors makes impossible any revelation
of information.
Going back to T=3, if outsiders did not learn θ, they do not present any
evidence to CA. Still in the case that insiders report satisfactorily at T=5, the
no submission of evidence from outsiders at T=7 can be interpreted either as a
truthful message that they do not have the information or as a strategic decision
of not showing evidence that goes against them. The asymmetry of information
respect to what outsiders know, leads CA to choose an unique insiders￿ standard
23We can also say that whenever θ ≥ θ2, informed outsiders do not have incentives to
pretend that they have not learned θ
24This result also holds when concealing evidence is feasible. Any policy seeking to extract
useful information from outsiders and that includes some manipulation is going to be domi-
nated by a truthtelling policy, case in which we know, outsiders prefer to mimick the types of
￿rms that did not learn θ. In the extreme situation of pure chaep talk communication (α =0 ),
any message sent by outsiders will have the same value for CA as not having a message, this
is the case labeled as ￿Babbling Equilibrium￿ in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
15θI. We will address in the extensions the possibility of making θI contingent on
whether the learning have occurred.
The optimal standard of proof for insiders, like in the case when we do not
count on outsiders, balances the cost of type I and type III error, but now takes
in account the additional fact that outsiders may learn the type and they will
disclose only type III error. Type I error will always remain uncovered.
Employing simple Bayesian updating, CA maximizes:
E[S]= ρSL(θI)+( 1 − ρ)SN(θI) (7)
Subject to the Incentive Compatibility conditions (IC):
U(θ)=ΠI (θ) − C (θI − θ) ≤ 0 ∀θ ≤ θ
∗
1 (8)
U(θ)=( 1 − ρ)ΠI (θ) − C (θ − θI) ≤ 0 ∀θ ≥ θ
∗
2
SL is the expected change in consumer surplus when outsiders have learned
θ and SN is the value of the same expression but when outsiders do not learn
anything. The objective function now is a weighted average of both scenario,











The diﬀerence between SL and SN is that when there is learning from out-
siders we do not have type III error. That is re￿ected in the upper limit of the
integral for both terms.
The (IC) constraints become:
ΠI (θ
∗
1) − C (θI − θ
∗
1)=0 (9)
(1 − ρ)ΠI (θ
∗
2) − C (θ
∗
2 − θI)=0 (10)


































To understand better the meaning of this new result, let suppose ￿rst that
there is the same knowledge about θ among insiders and outsiders, i.e. ρ = 1. In
this case, the second term of the right hand side disappears and remains only the
￿rst one. Since S (θ
∗
1) ≤ 0, the value of the derivative is always positive and the
optimal standard corresponds to the maximum value of θI given the constraints,
which means the standard θI is set in a way that completely eliminates type I
error i.e. θ
∗
1 = θ1. The intuition for that result is very simple: provided that
16we know by sure that outsiders will block any exit-inducing merger and won￿t
block anyone with θ ≤ θ1, we can push forward as much as possible the insiders
standard θI in order to screen out the low θ types without worrying about
attracting the high θ t y p e sb e c a u s et h o s eo n e sw i l lb eb l o c k e db yac o u n t e r
report form outsiders. The optimal decision policy of the CA is equivalent to a
complete specialization in the burden of proof between parties. The allocation
of the burden is done in a way that aligns the incentives of each party to submit
evidence with the interest of CA of having that evidence.
The above result is summarized in the proposition 2:
Proposition 2 When both parties -insiders and outsiders- know θ and that is
known by the Competition Authority, the optimal policy is a specialization in
the burden of proof. Insiders have to show that the merger has enough eﬃciency
gains (eﬃciency defense) and outsiders have to show that the merger can lead to
their exit (eﬃciency oﬀense). In equilibrium, only consumer surplus￿ increasing
merger are presented and the ￿rst best is achieved.
For values of ρ strictly lower than 1, CA cannot completely delegate the
task of stopping ￿oﬀensive mergers￿ to outsiders, because the latter may not be
able to obtain the information needed for making a credible report aimed to
stop the merger. Given that, CA must still count on insiders￿ report to screen
those mergers in the eventuality that outsiders do not learn θ. It is clear that
CA puts more trust on outsiders the bigger is ρ, making the chosen standard
θI monothonically increasing in ρ. This result, although intuitive, is due to
two separate eﬀects that work in the same direction: the Direct eﬀect and the
Deterrence eﬀect.
Direct eﬀect























Comparing it with the F.O.C. of equation 5 (when we have no outsider),
we can see that the diﬀerence is the term (1 − ρ) that multiplies the ￿rst term
of R.H.S. We have now that the marginal cost of type III error is diminished
by (1 − ρ). Since optimality imposes that both errors in the margin must be
equal, the type I error has to be diminished as well, implying that the optimal
standard θI moves upwards. Notice that the higher the ρ, the less likely or less
relevant type III error becomes, the more we can diminish type I error and the
more θI can move upwards25.
Deterrence Eﬀect.
This is an eﬀect that work through the IC constraint of the high θ types.
Comparing these constraints in the cases when we count and we do not count
with an outsider (equations 5 and 8), for the same θI, the value of θ
∗
2 is larger
when we do not count with an outsiders. Without an informed outsider, an
25In the extreme case of ρ = 1,we are back to proposition 1,w h e r eθI takes the maimum
value and is only used to get rid of type I error.
17insider with θ2 ≤ θ ≤ θ
∗
2 does not risk anything by preparing a costly defense
that he is not over θ
∗
2 since there is no possibility of facing a counter-evidence.
However, when there is a positive probability of having an informed outsider,
not all the insiders￿ types will spend resources in a report that can be blocked
afterwards by the other party. This is equivalent to say that the marginal cost
of lying upwards is augmented by
1
1 − ρ






always smaller when the outsider is present26. This transformation in the lying
cost function allows CA to move even forward the standard θI without risking
too much of attracting high θ types, respect to the case of no outsiders. Is easy
to see that this eﬀect, also makes type III error less important and again, gives
room to decrease type I error by displacing the θI upwards27.
In the case of having a corner solution when we count only with insiders
(ρ =0 ) ,t h es a m ee ﬀects are at work and the same result holds when we intro-
duce outsiders. The risk of type III is diminished by the same reasons already
presented, increasing the value of the derivative
dE[S]
dθI
and eventually making it
equal to zero, which would yield to an interior solution. By inspecting equation
11, it is clear that it is more likely that CA abandon the corner solution when
ρ is larger.
Proposition 3 When outsiders may learn the parameter θ with some positive
probability ρ, the insider￿s optimal standard θI (ρ) is weakly increasing in ρ. The
optimal policy contains in general both type I and type III errors, which are both
decreasing in ρ.
This proposition can be considered as a generalization of proposition 2, for
the case when is uncertain that outsiders are informed. For any value of ρ,
outsiders are called in only if they can show evidence that the merger produces
its exit and as long as they are informed they will eliminate any possibility of
approving exit-inducing mergers The standard of proof required for them (θ0) is
independent of ρ and perfectly screen out the types with θ ≥ θ2. Nevertheless,
the type III error emerges now as uncertainty about whether outsiders have
obtained the information. The burden of proof for the eﬃciency defense still
rests uniquely in the insiders, and this burden is going to be less stringent -higher
standard θI− the more reliable are the outsiders respect to provide relevant
evidence.28 R e m e m b e rt h a tt h ee x i s t e n c eo ft y p eI I Ie r r o ri sw h a tr e s t r a i nC A
for pushing upwards θI up to the maximum value (θI for ρ = 1). Because in






27Notice that this deterrence eﬀect does not apply for type I error since outsiders never are
going to disclose that θ ≤ θ1. Thus, the lying cost function becomes asymmetric, being more
costly to lie upwards than downwards.
28Some types of insiders bene￿t from having outsiders as a counter-part because thay are
not longer forced to downplay their level of EG.
18error implies that we accept some type I as well. Finally, in equilibrium only




2] are going to present evidence at T= 5. Those
with θ ≤ θ2 will be unopposed by outsiders and thus will be approved and those
with θ ∈ [θ2,θ
∗
2] will take the bet of presenting a case and will be opposed only
if competitors learned θ.
3E x t e n s i o n s
3.1 Altering the Timing of Disclosure
We have structured the disclosure game taking as given that CA gets ￿rst in-
formation from merging ￿rms and then, based in what it receives ask evidence
form outsiders. It may be reasonable to think that is better ￿rst to dissipate
the uncertainty about what outsiders can tell and then call insiders, applying
to them a standard of proof contingent on what outsiders have presented.
An alternative disclosure timing that switches the order of evidence showing
is the following:
T=1 Insiders announce to CA they want to merge (this announcement
is costless)
T=2 With probability ρ, outsiders learn the value of θ.
T=3 CA looking at the details of the proposal, establishes the approval
policy. This policy consists on a decision rule based on whether the evidence
{￿I,￿ O} presented by each parties lies inside of its corresponding admissible
intervals {RI,R O}.
T=4 CA asks ￿rst for a evidence ￿O from outsiders.
T=5 Outsiders, based on what they have learned on θ, in the standard
RO and in the decision rule decide whether or not to present a report ￿O to the
CA.
T=6 If outsiders present a report such that ￿O ∈ RO the merger is
blocked, otherwise CA asks a report form insiders.
T=7 Insiders decide whether or not to present a report ￿I about eﬃ-
ciency gains, knowing their type θ, the standard of proof required RI and the
decision rule of the CA.
T=8 CA accepts the merger if the message presented by insiders is such
that ￿I ∈ RI, Otherwise the merger is rejected.
It is clear that the standard of proof θ0 asked to outsiders is the same as
before, where CA eliminates mergers with θ ≥ θ2. In the end of the stage 5, we
may have two possible responses from outsiders: Either they present evidence
consistent with the standard of proof or they do not present any evidence at all.
The ￿rst case happens when they learn the type and θ ≥ θ2.T h en or e s p o n s e
case may have two interpretations: Outsiders did not learn θ or they did it
but they do not want to disclose it. In this second case, CA ask evidence form
insiders and de￿nes a standard of proof θI that takes in account the strategic
disclosure behavior form the outsiders. Again, using Bayesian updating, CA
19chooses θI by maximizing:
E[S]=ρSL(θI)+( 1 − ρ)SN(θI)












2) − C (θ
∗
2 − θI)=0
Comparing this program with the one of the basic timing, we see that the
objective function is the same in both cases. The disclosure strategy of the
outsiders is the same, whether they have to report in the ￿rst or second place.
It is always their dominant strategy reporting evidence against an exit-inducing
merger and is always a weakly dominant strategy not presenting evidence when
the merger cannot be blocked. In consequence, in both cases, θI is chosen
in a way that trade-oﬀ the two types of errors. We have that the direct eﬀect,
d e s c r i b e da b o v ea n dr e p r e s e n t e db yρ in the objective function, is present exactly
in the same way for both modalities of the game.
However, there is a diﬀerence in the IC constraint for the types over θ2.
Compared with the constraint in equation 8 ,there is no here the term (1 − ρ)
multiplying the insiders payoﬀ.W h e nθ2 ≤ θ ≤ θ
∗
2 , by making a report, insiders
do not risk being opposed by outsiders because there is no further requirement
of information. Having outsiders ￿rst, plays in favor of insiders because it
completely eliminates the uncertainty about having counter-evidence29.U s i n g
the above de￿ned terminology, the deterrence eﬀect vanishes when we switch
the order of reporting and ask to outsiders reporting ￿rst.
From the point of view of CA altering the timing is not bene￿cial due to
the disappearance of the deterrence eﬀect. Some non-desired merger will be
presented more often increasing type III error and CA will react by moving
downwards the standard θI and increasing type I error30.
By comparing the maximization program (including the IC constraints) of
both games we can observe that for any θI t h et y p eIe r r o ri st h es a m ei nb o t h
cases but the type III error is greater when outsiders report ￿rst because θ
∗
2
is larger. Therefore for any value of ρ, the total error is larger when CA asks
￿rst outsiders and then insiders. This result is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 An optimal policy that ask a report ￿rst form insiders and sec-
ond from outsiders is superior to a policy that ask ￿rst form outsiders and then
from insiders.
29This is equivalent to say that the asymmetry of information between insiders and outsiders
about whether outsiders know θ has been eliminated.
30The insiders have a second move advantage that is not in the bene￿to ft h eC A .
203.2 Interim Communication Among Parties
Now, we allow for the possibility that involved parties can exchanges messages
before the oﬃcial reporting process takes place. The interim communication is
about disclosing the other private information variable: whether or not outsiders
learned the value of θ.
The questions we want to address are two: Do outsiders have incentives to
communicate what they know? and It is in the interest of the CA that interim
communication takes place? We analyze the two possible cases: outsiders with
insiders and outsiders with CA, using the optimal game where insiders report
￿rst and then outsiders
Outsiders and insiders. Suppose that after T=2, outsiders have the pos-
sibility to tell insiders if they have learned the truth about θ. The communication
technology is just a message from outsiders to insiders saying that they know
the truth and the value of the parameter. This mean that outsiders, if they
wish, can transmit costless and truthfully their knowledge about θ to insiders.
In the case that outsiders know the information, it is clear that only when
θ2 ≥ θ ≥ θ
∗
2 they are strictly better oﬀ by telling insiders what they know31.
By revealing that, outsiders induce insiders to not present evidence because the
latter will not have to spend resources in preparing a report that and the end is
going to be opposed by the competitors. For this very same reason, outsiders also
save resources by not preparing an opposition32. Since both interested parties
are better-oﬀ with this communication and the outcome does not change for
CA (always merger is blocked) we have that allowing communication between
￿rms is a Pareto improvement whenever θ2 ≥ θ ≥ θ
∗
2.
The problem exists when θ lies in the same interval as before but outsiders
do not know the information. Because the ignorant outsider cannot mimic the
informed one33 the absence of truthful message form outsiders is interpreted by
insiders as ignorance of the outsiders. This imply that the uncertainty about
whether they will be blocked by an counter-report disappear and merging ￿rms
will be more willing to present favorable evidence for not desirable mergers.
In other words, the deterrence eﬀect is out and we are in the same scenario
as when outsiders report ￿rst and insiders second. As we now, this structure
of the game is not optimal from the point of view of the CA and consequently,
allowing communication among parties is ex-ante ineﬃcient.
Outsiders and CA We know that if outsiders are as well informed as
insiders, CA can obtain the ￿rst best. However is not always in the interest of
31For the other values of θ,insiders are not going to change the reporting strategy of insiders
and thus they are indiﬀerent between reporting and not doing it. We assume that in the case
of indiﬀerence, outsiders do not send messages at all.
32Remember that the optimal policy, in equilibrium have both parties presenting opposite
reports when outsider learn θ and θ2 ≥ θ ≥ θ∗
2. In this case the outcome is a rejection of the
merger.
33The probability of guessing θ for the outsiders is zero.
21competitors to transmit to the CA that they are informed. First we have to
clarify how outsiders would transmit that information to CA. We assume that
there is a simple cheap talk communication among them, where the competitors
just send a message saying: we know the truth or we do not know it. When
outsiders learn θ, they only want to communicate it only to CA if θ ≥ θ2 for
the same reasons exposed above: Insiders learning that outsiders are informed
a r en o tg o i n gt op r e s e n tad e f e n s ef o rt h e i rc a s ea n dt h i ss a v ea l s oar e p o r tt o
outsiders34. The way CA signals to insiders that is informed about outsiders
knowledge is through the choice of the standard of proof θI, that in this case of
an informed outsider, will be the maximum value: θI (ρ = 1).
When outsiders do not learn θ,they cannot pretend to know it because they
are not able to produce ant report. If we assume that CA can ￿ne afterwards a
lying ￿rm for claiming that they have some evidence without support, we rule
out this mimicking behavior of the ignorant outsider35.
Given that outsiders do not lie about whether they know something, then CA
has two scenarios: Either it receives a message from outsiders saying that they
know the truth implying that θ ≥ θ2 or he does not receive any message at all,
which may imply that outsiders know something but θ ≤ θ2or they did not learn
the type. In the ￿rst scenario, the best policy is to set θI = θI (ρ = 1),inducing
insiders to not present a report and in the second scenario the standard is
obtained by Bayesian updating. Is clear that this structure is the same as the
game where outsiders report ￿rst and insiders second, again, the deterrence
eﬀects completely vanishes because insiders learn what outsiders know through
the standard of proof they face. Asking outsiders whether they have some
information is totally equivalent to asking them at the same time to reveal
what they know. This equivalence rests in the fact that outsiders only have
incentives to reveal the information when θ ≥ θ2. The main message of this
section is that allowing outsiders to communicate to other parties what they
know is socially detrimental because it destroy the deterrence eﬀect of insiders
ignorance about what opposition they will face.
We summarize the results in proposition 5
Proposition 5 Any interim communication between outsiders and the rest of
the parties -insiders and CA-respect to what the ￿rst ones know, even if ex-
post eﬃcient is not desirable form the ex-ante point of view since it completely
eliminate the deterrence eﬀect.
34Notice that when θ∗
1 ≤ θ ≤ θ1 outsiders do not want to disclose they are informed because
that will completely eliminate the possibility that a merger that favour them be accepted. For
the remaining interval, outsiders are indiferent.
35Notice that lying about knowing something is not the same as lying about what ￿rms
know. The ￿rst one is veri￿able because an ignorant ￿rm cannot produce any evidence.The
second one is subject to manipulation.
224C O N C L U S I O N
This paper provides many interesting insights that are useful for an optimal
implementation of antitrust policy when asymmetry of information plays a rel-
e v a n tr o l ea si st h ec a s eo fe ﬃciency gains in merger control. As we have
demonstrated, the feasibility of screening pro-competitive mergers is severely
aﬀected in markets that are highly concentrated, where exit is a concern and
entry is not likely to timely take place. The con￿ict of objectives of simultane-
ously detecting two types of anti-competitive mergers has real basis as has been
reported with two important cases presented before the European Commission.
Instead of applying an outright prohibition of those mergers or concentrate only
in the eﬃciency defense problem, CA can still have two-side screening by mak-
ing intelligent use of informed parties, even if they can manipulate -upwards
or downwards- the evidence. The specialization in the burden of proof result
hinges in the incentives that each party has to disclose information in any of
the two possible anticompetitive contingencies. Even if it would be less costly
for outsiders to proof that a merger fails the eﬃciency defense test, that is not
feasible to apply due to the evident divergence of interests between outsiders
and CA. However, the fact that we can count on them for detecting oﬀensive
mergers, allows CA to reduce the type I error by applying a more demanding
standard of proof for eﬃciency defense to insiders. The possibility of counting
with an informed competitor decreases both types of errors and makes more
credible the claims of eﬃciency gains of merging ￿rms.
The second important result, which is unexpected, is that transparency, in
the sense of making each party know what evidence the other party has, is
not desirable. Even though is ex-post a Pareto improvement to make public
that outsiders have evidence against a exit inducing merger, this is not eﬃcient
ex-ante since makes insiders perfectly aware of the opposition they will face,
giving them incentives to overstate their claim and by consequence, increasing
the scope for manipulation and error. The implications of this last ￿nding are
multiple: (1)I sb e t t e rt om a k ei n s i d e r sd i s c l o s e￿rst and outsiders second (2)
CA has to apply a standard of proof applied to insiders that is independent of
the information outsiders have and (3) CA has to prohibit any communication
among parties about what they know. Notice that using consumer surplus as
standard is bene￿cial because does not create a commitment problem to CA
about allowing communication in the state of world where EG are very high
and outsiders are informed.
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